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Abstract	  10	   This	   paper	   presents	   a	   discussion	   of	   some	   of	   the	   issues	   associated	   with	   the	  11	   multiple	   sources	   of	   uncertainty	   and	   non-­‐stationarity	   in	   the	   analysis	   and	  12	   modelling	   of	   hydrological	   systems.	   	   	   Different	   forms	   of	   aleatory,	   epistemic,	  13	   sematic	   and	   ontological	   uncertainty	   are	   defined.	   	   	   	   The	   potential	   for	   epistemic	  14	   uncertainties	   to	   induce	   disinformation	   in	   calibration	   data	   and	   arbitrary	   non-­‐15	   stationarities	   in	   model	   error	   characteristics,	   and	   surprises	   in	   predicting	   the	  16	   future,	   are	   discussed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   other	   forms	   of	   non-­‐stationary.	   	   	   	   It	   is	  17	   suggested	  that	  a	  condition	  tree	  is	  used	  to	  be	  explicit	  about	  the	  assumptions	  that	  18	   underlie	   any	   assessment	   of	   uncertainty.	   	   	   This	   also	   provides	   an	   audit	   trail	   for	  19	   providing	  evidence	  to	  decision	  makers.	  20	  
	  21	  
	  22	  
Introduction	  23	   I	  first	  started	  carrying	  out	  Monte	  Carlo	  experiments	  with	  hydrological	  models	  in	  24	   1980,	  while	  working	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Virginia.	  	  	  	  This	  was	  not	  a	  new	  approach	  25	   at	   that	   time,	   but	   the	   computing	   facilities	   available	   (a	   CDC600	   “mainframe”	  26	   computer	  at	  UVa)	  made	  it	  feasible	  for	  the	  types	  of	  hydrological	  model	  being	  used	  27	   then.	   	   	   Adopting	   a	   Monte	   Carlo	   approach	   was	   a	   response	   to	   a	   personal	   “gut	  28	   feeling”	   that	   traditional	   statistical	   approaches	   (at	   that	   time	   an	   analysis	   of	  29	   uncertainty	  around	   the	  maximum	   likelihood	  model)	  were	  not	  sufficient	   to	  deal	  30	   with	   the	  complex	  sources	  of	  uncertainty	   in	   the	  hydrological	  modelling	  process.	  	  	  31	   Over	   time,	   we	   have	   learned	   much	   more	   about	   how	   to	   discuss	   facets	   of	  32	   uncertainty	   in	   terms	   of	   aleatory,	   epistemic,	   ontological,	   linguistic,	   and	   other	  33	   types	   of	   uncertainty	   (for	   one	   set	   of	   definitions	   see	   Table	   1).	   	   	   Our	   perceptual	  34	   model	  of	  uncertainty	   is	  now	  much	  more	  sophisticated	  but	   I	  will	  argue	  that	  this	  35	   has	  not	   resulted	   in	  analogous	  progress	   in	  uncertainty	  quantification	  and,	  more	  36	   particularly,	  uncertainty	  reduction.	  As	  one	  referee	  on	  this	  paper	  suggested,	  it	  can	  37	   be	  argued	  that	  the	  classification	  of	  uncertainties	  is	  not	  really	  necessary:	  there	  are	  38	   only	  epistemic	  uncertainties	  (arising	  from	  lack	  of	  knowledge)	  because	  we	  simply	  39	   do	  not	  know	  enough	  about	  hydrological	  systems	  and	  their	  inputs	  and	  outputs.	  	  It	  40	   is	  then	  a	  matter	  of	  choice	  as	  to	  how	  to	  treat	  those	  uncertainties,	  including	  formal	  41	   probabilistic	  and	  statistical	  frameworks.	  42	   	  43	   What	   is	   clear	   is	   that	   such	   epistemic	  uncertainties	  will	   limit	   the	   inferences	   that	  44	   can	  be	  made	  about	  hydrological	  systems.	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  are	  often	  dependent	  45	   on	  the	  uncertainties	  associated	  with	  past	  observations	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Figure	  46	   1)	   and	   have	   not	   really	   done	   a	   great	   deal	   about	   reducing	   hydrological	   data	  47	   uncertainties	   into	   the	  past.	   	   	   Some	  observational	  uncertainties	   can	  certainly	  be	  48	   treated	   as	   random	   variability	   or	   aleatory,	   but	   can	   also	   be	   subject	   to	   arbitrary	  49	  
uncertainties.	   	   	   Here,	   I	   use	   the	   word	   arbitrary	   to	   distinguish	   epistemic	  50	   uncertainties	   that	   do	   not	   have	   simple	   structure	   or	   stationary	   statistical	  51	   characteristics	  on	  the	  time	  scales	  used	  for	  model	  calibration	  and	  evaluation.	  	  This	  52	   time	  scale	  qualification	  is	  important	  in	  this	  context	  since	  the	  only	  information	  we	  53	   will	  have	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  different	  sources	  of	  uncertainties	  on	  model	  outputs	  54	   will	  be	  contained	  in	  the	  sequences	  of	  model	  residuals	  within	  some	  limited	  period	  55	   of	   time.	   	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   show	   that	   stochastic	   models	   based	   on	   purely	   aleatory	  56	   variability	  can	  exhibit	  apparent	  short	  period	  irregularity	  or	  non-­‐stationarity	  (see	  57	   for	  example	  Kousoyiannis,	  2010;	  Montanari	  and	  Koutsoyiannis,	  2012).	  	  However,	  58	   there	   is	   then	   the	  question	  of	   how	   to	   identify	   the	   characteristics	   of	   long	  period	  59	   variability	  from	  shorter	  periods	  of	  model	  residuals	  that	  might	  contain	  the	  type	  of	  60	   arbitrary	  characteristics	  defined	  above.	  	  	  	  It	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  some	  arbitrary	  61	   uncertainties	   of	   this	   type	   might	   be	   disinformative	   to	   the	   model	   calibration	  62	   process	   (Beven	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Beven	   and	   Westerberg,	   2011;	   Beven	   and	   Smith,	  63	   2014;	  Kauffeldt	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Figure	  1),	  even	  if	  they	  might	  be	  informative	  in	  other	  64	   senses	  (such	  as	  in	  identifying	  inconsistences	  in	  hydrological	  observations,	  Beven	  65	   and	  Smith,	  2014).	  	  	  	  66	   	  67	   A	  disinformative	  event	  in	  this	  context	  is	  one	  for	  which	  the	  observational	  data	  are	  68	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   fundamental	   principles	   (or	   capacities	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  69	   Cartwright,	   1999)	   that	   might	   be	   applied	   to	   hydrological	   systems	   and	   models.	  	  70	   Most	   hydrological	   simulation	   models	   (as	   opposed	   to	   forecasting	   models,	   see	  71	   Young	   and	   Beven,	   2013)	   impose	   a	   principle	   of	   mass	   balance.	   	   	   We	   expect	  72	   catchment	   systems	   to	   also	   satisfy	   mass	   balance	   (and	   energy	   balance,	   and	  73	   momentum	  balance,	  see	  Reggiani	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  	  	  The	  observational	  data,	  however,	  74	   might	  not.	  	  	  Figure	  1	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this,	  with	  far	  more	  output	  as	  discharge	  75	   from	   the	   catchment	   than	   the	   recorded	   inputs	   for	   that	   event.	   	  While	   there	   are	  76	   some	  circumstances,	  such	  as	  a	  rain-­‐on-­‐snow	  event	  where	  this	  could	  be	  realistic	  77	   scenario,	  	  clearly	  no	  model	  that	  is	  constrained	  by	  mass	  balance	  would	  be	  able	  to	  78	   reproduce	  such	  an	  event,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  residuals	  would	  induce	  bias	  in	  any	  79	   model	  inference.	  	  	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  we	  should	  take	  a	  much	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  80	   data	   to	   be	   used	   in	   model	   calibration	   and	   evaluation	   before	   running	   a	   model	  81	   (including	  the	  neglect	  of	  potential	  snowmelt	  inputs).	  82	   	  83	   The	  implication	  of	  allowing	  that	  some	  model	  residuals	  might	  be	  affected	  by	  this	  84	   type	   of	   arbitrary	   epistemic	   uncertainty	   is	   that	   commonly	   used	   probabilistic	   or	  85	   statistical	   approaches	   to	  uncertainty	   estimation	  do	  not	   take	  enough	  account	  of	  86	   the	   epistemic	   nature	   of	   uncertainty	   in	   the	   modelling	   process.	   It	   is	   not	   just	   a	  87	   matter	   of	   finding	   an	   appropriate	   statistical	   distribution	   or,	   alternatively,	   some	  88	   non-­‐parametric	  probabilistic	  structure	  for	  the	  model	  residuals	  (e.g.	  Schoups	  and	  89	   Vrugt,	   2010;	   Sikorska	   et	   al.,	   2014),	   especially	   when	   the	   sample	   of	   possible	  90	   arbitrary	   uncertainties	   (or	   surprises)	   might	   be	   small.	   	   It	   will	   be	   suggested	   in	  91	   what	  follows	  that	  we	  need	  to	  be	  more	  pro-­‐active	  about	  methods	  for	  uncertainty	  92	   identification	  and	  reduction.	  	  	  This	  might	  help	  to	  resolve	  some	  of	  the	  differences	  93	   between	  current	  approaches.	  	  94	   	  95	  
Defining	  Types	  of	  Uncertainty	  (and	  why	  the	  differences	  are	  important)	  96	  
	  97	  
Past	  analysis	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  modelling	  domains	  in	  the	  environmental	  sciences	  has	  98	   distinguished	   a	   variety	   of	   types	   of	   uncertainties	   and	   errors,	   including	   aleatory	  99	   uncertainty,	   epistemic	   uncertainty,	   semantic	   or	   linguistic	   uncertainty	   and	  100	   ontological	  uncertainty	  (e.g.	  Beven	  and	  Binley,	  1992;	  McBratney,	  1992;	  Regan	  et	  101	   al.,	  2002;	  Ascough	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Beven,	  2009;	  Beven	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Raadgever	  et	  al.,	  102	   2011;	  Beven	  and	  Young,	  2013).	  	  	  Table	  1	  lists	  one	  such	  classification	  relevant	  to	  103	   the	  application	  of	  hydrological	  models.	   	   	   In	  particular,	   the	  definition	  of	  aleatory	  104	   uncertainty	  is	  constrained	  to	  the	  case	  of	  of	  stationary	  statistical	  variation	  (noting	  105	   that	   this	   might	   involve	   a	   structural	   statistical	   model	   but	   with	   stationary	  106	   parameters),	   for	   which	   the	   full	   power	   of	   statistical	   theory	   and	   inference	   is	  107	   appropriate.	   	   	   Epistemic	   uncertainties,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   have	   been	   broken	  108	   down	  into	  those	  associated	  with	  model	  forcing	  data	  and	  observations	  of	  system	  109	   response,	  and	  those	  associated	  with	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  system	  dynamics.	  	  110	   As	   in	   Figure	   1,	   the	   observational	   data	   might	   sometimes	   be	   hydrologically	  111	   inconsistent,	  and	  might	  lead	  to	  disinformation	  being	  fed	  into	  the	  model	  inference	  112	   process	   	   (Beven	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Beven	   and	   Smith,	   2014).	   	   Any	   of	   these	  might	   be	  113	   sources	  of	  the	  rather	  arbitrary	  nature	  of	  errors	  in	  the	  forcing	  data	  and	  resulting	  114	   model	  residual	  variability	  noted	  above.	  115	   	  116	   Many	  aspects	  of	   the	  modelling	  process	   involve	  multiple	  sources	  of	  uncertainty,	  117	   and	  without	  making	  very	  strong	  assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  different	  118	   sources	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   separate	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   different	   uncertainties	  119	   (Beven,	  2005).	  	  	  Attempts	  to	  separate	  the	  error	  associated	  with	  rainfall	  inputs	  to	  120	   a	   catchment,	   for	   example,	   result	   in	   some	   large	   changes	   to	   event	   inputs	   and	   a	  121	   strong	  interaction	  with	  model	  structural	  error	  (e.g.	  Vrugt	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Kuczera	  et	  122	   al.,	   2010;	   Renard	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   	   	   The	   very	   fact	   that	   there	   are	   epistemic	  123	   uncertainties	   arising	   from	   lack	   of	   knowledge	   about	   how	   to	   represent	   the	  124	   response,	  about	   the	   forcing	  data,	  and	  about	   the	  observed	  responses,	   reinforces	  125	   this	   problem.	   	   If	   we	   knew	  what	   type	   of	   assumptions	   to	  make	   then	   the	   errors	  126	   would	  no	  longer	  be	  epistemic	  in	  nature.	  	  127	   	  128	   	  129	  
Defining	   a	   method	   of	   uncertainty	   estimation	   (and	   why	   there	   is	   so	   much	  130	  
controversy	  about	  how	  to	  do	  so)	  131	  
	  132	   Uncertainty	   estimation	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   considerable	   debate	   in	   the	  133	   hydrological	   literature.	   	   	  There	   are	   those	  who	   consider	   that	   formal	   statistics	   is	  134	   the	   only	   way	   to	   have	   an	   objective	   estimate	   of	   uncertainty	   in	   terms	   of	  135	   probabilities	  (e.g.	  Mantovan	  and	  Todini,	  2006;	  Stedinger	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  or	  that	  the	  136	   only	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  unpredictable	  is	  as	  probabilistic	  variation	  (Montanari,	  137	   2007;	  Montanari	   and	  Koutsoyiannis,	   2012).	   	  There	   are	   those	  who	  have	  argued	  138	   that	   treating	   all	   uncertainties	   as	   aleatory	   random	   variables	   will	   lead	   to	  139	   overconfidence	   in	   model	   identification,	   so	   that	   more	   informal	   likelihood	  140	   measures	   or	   limits	   of	   acceptability	   might	   be	   justified	   (e.g.	   within	   the	   GLUE	  141	   framework	   of	   Beven,	   2006,	   2012;	   Beven	   and	   Binley,	   1992,	   2013;	   Freer	   et	   al.,	  142	   2004;	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  and	  within	  Approximate	  Bayesian	  Computation	  by	  Nott	  143	   et	  al.	  2012;	  and	  Sadegh	  and	  Vrugt,	  2013,	  2014).	  	  	  There	  are	  those	  who	  recognise	  144	   the	  complex	  structure	  of	  hydrological	  model	  errors	  but	  who	  use	  transformations	  145	   of	  different	  types	  to	  fit	  within	  a	  formal	  statistical	  framework	  (e.g.	  Montanari	  and	  146	  
Brath,	   2005).	   	   	   	   Some	   of	   these	   opinions	   have	   been	   explored	   in	   a	   number	   of	  147	   commentaries	  and	  opinion	  pieces	  (Beven,	  2006a,b,	  2008,	  2012;	  Hamilton,	  2007;	  148	   Montanari,	  2007;	  Hall	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Sivakumar,	  2008;	  Todini	  and	  Mantovan,	  2008)	  149	   as	  well	  as	  in	  more	  technical	  papers.	  150	   	  151	   There	   is,	   of	   course,	   no	   right	   answer	   –	   precisely	   because	   there	   are	   multiple	  152	   sources	  of	  epistemic	  uncertainty,	  including	  model	  structural	  uncertainty,	  that	  are	  153	   impossible	   to	   separate.	   There	   are	   also	   different	   frameworks	   for	   assessing	  154	   uncertainties	  and	  different	  ways	  of	  formulating	  likleihoods.	  	  If	  we	  had	  knowledge	  155	   of	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  uncertainty	  then	  they	  would	  not	  be	  epistemic	  156	   and	  we	  might	   then	   be	  more	   confident	   about	   using	   formal	   statistical	   theory	   to	  157	   deal	  with	  all	   the	  sources	  of	  unpredictability.	   	   	  As	  noted	  earlier,	   some	  epistemic	  158	   uncertainties	  should	  be	  reducible	  by	  further	  experimentation	  or	  observation,	  so	  159	   that	  there	  is	  an	  expectation	  that	  we	  might	  move	  towards	  more	  aleatory	  residual	  160	   error	   in	   the	   future.	   	   	   In	   hydrology,	   however,	   this	   still	   seems	   a	   long	   way	   off,	  161	   particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  hydrological	  properties	  of	  the	  subsurface.	  	  	  	  And	  162	   if,	  of	  course,	  there	  is	  no	  right	  answer	  then	  this	  leaves	  plenty	  of	  scope	  for	  different	  163	   philosophical	   and	   technical	   approaches	   for	   uncertainty	   estimation	   –	   or,	   put	  164	   another	   way,	   how	   to	   define	   an	   uncertainty	   estimation	   methodology	   involves	  165	   ontological	  uncertainties	  (Table	  1).	  	  	  	  In	  this	  situation	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  uncertainty	  166	   about	  uncertainty	  estimation,	  and	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  167	   future.	   	   	   This	   has	   the	   consequence	   that	   communication	   of	   the	   meaning	   of	  168	   different	  estimates	  of	  uncertainty	  can	  be	  difficult.	  	  	  This	  should	  not,	  however,	  be	  169	   an	   excuse	   for	   not	   being	   quite	   clear	   about	   the	   assumptions	   that	   are	   made	   in	  170	   producing	   a	   particular	   uncertainty	   estimate	   (Faulkner	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Beven	   and	  171	   Alcock,	  2012;	  see	  later).	  	  172	   	  173	  
Defining	  non-­‐stationarity	  (in	  catchments	  and	  model	  residuals)	  174	  
	  175	   Many	  people	  think	  that	  the	  only	  important	  distinction	  in	  the	  modelling	  process	  is	  176	   between	   variables	   that	   are	   predictable	   and	   uncertainties	   that	   are	   not.	   	   Model	  177	   residuals	   might	   have	   components	   of	   both:	   	   some	   identifiable	   predictable	  178	   structure	   as	   well	   as	   some	   unpredictable	   variability.	   	   	   The	   structure	   indicates	  179	   some	   aspect	   of	   the	   system	   dynamics	   (or	   boundary	   condition	   and	   evaluation	  180	   data)	   that	   is	   not	   being	   captured	   by	   the	   model.	   	   It	   is	   often	   represented	   as	   a	  181	   deterministic	  function.	  	  In	  the	  very	  simplest	  case,	  a	  stationary	  mean	  bias;	  in	  more	  182	   complex	  cases	  the	  function	  might	  indicate	  some	  structured	  variability	  in	  time	  or	  183	   space,	  such	  as	  a	  trend	  or	  seasonal	  component.	  	  	  The	  unpredictable	  component,	  on	  184	   the	  other	  hand,	   is	   usually	   treated	   as	   if	   the	   variability	   is	   purely	   aleatory	   on	   the	  185	   basis	   that	   if	  something	   is	  not	  predictable	   then	   it	  should	  be	  considered	  within	  a	  186	   probabilistic	  framework	  (e.g.	  Montanari,	  2007)	  albeit	  that,	  as	  already	  noted,	  the	  187	   nature	   of	   that	   variability	   might	   have	   some	   long	   time	   scale	   properties	  188	   (Koutsoyiannis,	  2010;	  Montanari	  and	  Koutsoyiannis,	  2012).	  189	   	  190	   This	   is	   important	   because	   it	   has	   implications	   for	   evaluating	   models	   as	  191	   hypotheses	   in	   the	   face	  of	   epistemic	   errors	   (or	   long	   time	   scale	   aleatory	  errors).	  	  	  192	   Hypothesis	   testing	   has	   traditionally	   been	   the	   realm	  of	   statistical	   inference	   and	  193	   probability,	   including	   the	   recent	   application	   of	   Bayesian	   statistical	   theory	   to	  194	   hydrological	  modelling	  (e.g.	  Clark	  et	  al.,	  2011).	   	   	  Purely	  empirically,	  probability	  195	  
and	   statistics	   can,	   of	   course,	   describe	   anything	   from	   observations	   to	   model	  196	   residuals	  regardless	  of	  the	  actual	  sources	  of	  uncertainty	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  our	  197	   reasonable	   expectations	   (Cox,	   1946).	   	   	  However,	   for	   any	  particular	   set	   of	   data,	  198	   the	  resulting	  probabilities	  are	  conditional	  on	  the	  sample	  being	  considered.	  	  	  This	  199	   is	  one	  reason	  why	  we	  try	  to	  abstract	  the	  empirical	  to	  a	  functional	  distributional	  200	   form	  or	  the	  type	  of	  empirical	  non-­‐parametric	  distributions	  used	  by	  Sikorska	  et	  al.	  201	   (2014)	  or	  Beven	  and	  Smith	  (2014).	  202	   	  203	   For	   simple	   cases	   where	   the	   empirical	   sample	   is	   random	   and	   stationary	   in	   its	  204	   characteristics	  (after	  taking	  account	  of	  any	  well	  defined	  structure)	  then	  there	  is	  a	  205	   body	   of	   theory	   to	   suggest	   what	   we	   should	   expect	   in	   terms	   of	   variability	   in	  206	   statistical	   characteristics	   as	   a	   function	   of	   sample	   size.	   	   	   There	   is	   also	   then	   a	  207	   formal	   relationship	   between	   the	   statistical	   characteristics	   and	   a	   likelihood	  208	   function	   that	   can	  be	  used	   in	  model	  evaluation.	   	   	  The	  simplest	   case	   is	  when	   the	  209	   statistics	  of	  the	  sample	  have	  zero	  mean	  bias,	  constant	  variance,	  are	  independent	  210	   and	   can	   be	   summarized	   as	   a	   Gaussian	   distribution.	   	   More	   complex	   likelihood	  211	   functions	   could	   take	   account	   of	   bias,	   heteroscedasticity,	   autocorrelation	   and	  212	   other	   assumptions	   about	   the	   distribution.	   	   	   	   Even	   these	   more	   complex	   cases,	  213	   however,	  are	  what	  I	  have	  called	  ideal	  cases	  in	  the	  past	  (e.g.	  Beven,	  2002;	  2006a).	  	  214	   Fundamentally,	   they	   assume	   all	   variability	   in	   model	   residuals	   is	   aleatory	   in	  215	   nature.	  216	   	  217	   But	  real	  problems	  are	  not	  ideal	  in	  this	  sense,	  as	  illustrated	  above	  they	  are	  subject	  218	   to	  arbitrary	  epistemic	  errors.	  	  It	  is	  then	  debatable	  as	  to	  whether	  it	  is	  appropriate	  219	   to	   treat	   the	   errors	   as	   if	   they	   are	   aleatory.	   	   	   The	   reason	   is	   that	   the	   effective	  220	   information	  content	  of	  any	  observations	  (or	  model	  residuals)	  will	  be	  reduced	  by	  221	   epistemic	  uncertainties	  relative	  to	  the	  ideal	  case.	  	  	  Why	  is	  this?	  	  	  It	  is	  because	  the	  222	   stationary	  parameter	  assumption	  of	  the	  aleatory	  component	  gives	  the	  possibility	  223	   of	   future	   surprise	   a	   very	   low	   likelihood.	   	   	   Yet	   evaluating	   the	   performance	   of	  224	   hydrological	  models	   in	  real	  applications	  often	  reveals	  surprises	  that	  are	  clearly	  225	   not	   aleatory	   in	   this	  way,	   including	   occasional	   surprises	   of	   gross	   under	   or	   over	  226	   predictions.	   	   	   	  This	  makes	   it	  difficult	   to	  define	  a	   formal	   statistical	  model	  of	   the	  227	   residual	  structure	  and	  consequently,	   if	  the	  methods	  of	  estimating	  likelihoods	  in	  228	   formal	  statistics	  are	  not	  valid,	  makes	  hypothesis	  testing	  of	  models	  more	  difficult	  229	   (e.g.	  Beven,	  2010;	  Beven	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  	  	  230	   	  231	   Consider	  the	  situation	  where	  the	  estimates	  of	  rainfall	  over	  a	  catchment	  might	  be	  232	   of	  variable	  quality	  during	  a	  series	  of	  events	  in	  a	  model	  calibration	  period.	  	  	  	  The	  233	   error	   in	   the	   estimates	   is	   not	   aleatory	   or	   distributional	   in	   nature	   because	   the	  234	   distribution	  of	  events	  is	  not	  expected	  to	  be	  stationary	  (except	  possibly	  over	  very	  235	   long	  periods	  of	  time	  but	  that	  is	  not	  really	  of	  interest	  for	  the	  period	  of	  calibration	  236	   data	  that	  might	  be	  available).	  	  	  This	   is	  the	  context	   in	  which	  we	  can	  describe	  the	  237	   variability	   as	   rather	   arbitrary	   i.e.	   we	   do	   not	   really	   know	   whether	   the	   rainfall	  238	   uncertainties	   conform	   to	   any	   statistical	   distribution	   or	   if	   the	   errors	   in	   a	  239	   calibration	  period	  are	  a	  good	  guide	  to	  the	  errors	  in	  the	  prediction	  period	  that	  we	  240	   are	  actually	  interested	  in.	  	  The	  same	  could	  be	  true,	  of	  course,	  for	  aleatory	  errors	  241	   with	  long-­‐term	  properties	  (see	  examples	  in	  Koutsoyiannis,	  2010;	  Montanari	  and	  242	   Koutsoyiannis,	   2012;	   Koutsoyiannis	   and	   Montanari,	   2015).	   	   The	   underlying	  243	   stochastic	  process	  might	   then	  be	   stationary	  but	   it	  might	  be	  difficult	   to	   identify	  244	  
the	   properties	   of	   that	   process	   from	   a	   short-­‐term	   sample	  with	   apparently	   non-­‐245	   stationary	  statistics.	  	  These	  are	  then	  both	  forms	  of	  epistemic	  uncertainty.	  	  In	  both	  246	   cases	  we	   lack	  knowledge	  about	   the	  arbitrary	  nature	  of	  events	  or	   the	  stochastic	  247	   process.	   	  We	   could	   in	  principle,	   of	   course,	   constrain	   that	   uncertainty	  by	  better	  248	   observational	   methods,	   or	   longer	   data	   series	   -­‐	   though	   that	   is	   not	   very	   useful	  249	   when	  we	   only	   have	   access	   to	   calibration	   data	   collected	   in	   the	   past,	   even	   if	  we	  250	   might	  hope	  to	  have	  improved	  data	  into	  the	  future.	  	  	  	  	  	  251	   	  252	   An	  interesting	  example	  in	  this	  respect	  is	  the	  post-­‐audit	  analyses	  of	  a	  number	  of	  253	   groundwater	   modelling	   studies	   presented	   in	   Konikow	   and	   Bredehoeft	   (1992)	  254	   and	   Anderson	   and	   Woessner	   (1992).	   	   	   Model	   predictions	   of	   future	   aquifer	  255	   behavior	  were	  compared	  with	  what	  actually	  happened	  as	  the	  future	  evolved.	  	  	  In	  256	   most	  studies	  the	  models	  failed	  to	  predict	  the	  future	  that	  actually	  happened.	   	   	  In	  257	   some	  cases	  this	  was	  because,	  with	  hindsight,	  the	  original	  model	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  258	   rather	  poor;	  in	  other	  cases	  it	  was	  because	  the	  future	  boundary	  conditions	  for	  the	  259	   simulations	   had	   not	   been	   well	   predicted.	   	   	   In	   hindcasting	   with	   the	   correct	  260	   boundary	   conditions	   the	  predictions	  were	  much	  better.	   	   	  Hindcasting	   is	  not	   all	  261	   that	  useful,	  however.	  	  Where	  modelling	  is	  used	  to	  inform	  decision	  making	  (as	  in	  262	   these	  groundwater	   cases)	   it	   is	  predictions	  of	   the	   future	   that	  are	   required.	   	   	   	   In	  263	   these	  studies	  therefore,	  error	  characteristics	  were	  not	  stationary	  and	  the	  future	  264	   turned	   out	   to	   hold	   epistemic	   surprises	   (either	   that	   the	   calibrated	   model	   was	  265	   poor,	  or	  that	  the	  changes	  in	  boundary	  conditions	  were	  not	  those	  expected).	  266	   	  267	   These	   examples	   involve	   a	   number	   of	   forms	   of	   non-­‐stationarity.	   	   These	   are	  268	   summarized	   in	   Table	   2.	   	   	   In	   Class	   1	   we	   place	   the	   classical	   definition	   of	   non-­‐269	   stationarity	  discussed	  by	  Koutsoyiannis	  and	  Montanari	  (2015)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  270	   stochastic	  process	  theory.	  	  	  They,	  in	  fact,	  consider	  that	  this	  is	  the	  only	  legitimate	  271	   use	  of	  the	  word	  non-­‐stationarity	  in	  being	  consistent	  with	  its	  technical	  definition.	  	  	  	  272	   In	   doing	   so,	   they	   are	   assuming	   that	   once	   any	   deterministic	   structure	   has	   been	  273	   taken	   into	   account,	   all	   forms	   of	   epistemic	   error	   can	   be	   represented	   by	   a	  274	   stationary	   stochastic	   model.	   	   	   The	   parameters	   of	   that	   model	   will,	   under	   the	  275	   ergodic	  hypothesis,	  converge	  to	  the	  true	  values	  of	  the	  stochastic	  process	  as	  more	  276	   and	   more	   observations	   are	   collected.	   That	   might,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   complex	  277	   stochastic	   process	   (or	   even	   some	   simple	   fractal	   processes)	   take	   a	   very	   large	  278	   sample,	   but	   that	   does	   not	   negate	   the	   principle.	   	   	   Indeed,	   for	   a	   deterministic	  279	   dynamical	   system,	   a	   stochastic	   representation	   will	   have	   stationary	   properties	  280	   only	  if	  it	  is	  ergodic.	  	  	  If	  non-­‐stationarity	  is	  assumed,	  then	  the	  system	  will	  not	  have	  281	   ergodic	  properties	  and,	  Koutsoyiannis	  and	  Montanari	  (2015)	  suggest,	   inference	  282	   will	  be	  impossible.	  	  	  This	  view	  means	  either	  we	  are	  back	  to	  treating	  all	  epistemic	  283	   uncertainty	  as	  aleatory	  and	  stationary,	  once	  any	  deterministic	  structure	  has	  been	  284	   removed,	   or	   we	   are	   simply	   left	   with	   unpredictability	   as	   a	   result	   of	   lack	   of	  285	   knowledge.	  286	   	  287	   This	  view	  has	  the	  backing	  of	   formal	  stochastic	   theory	  but	   I	   think	  there	  are	  two	  288	   issues	  with	  it.	  	  	  The	  first	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  what	  might	  hold	  in	  the	  ergodic	  289	   case	   and	   the	   limit	   sample	   of	   behaviours	   we	   have	   in	   calibrating	   models	   in	  290	   practical	  applications.	  	  The	  example	  of	  a	  stationary	  stochastic	  process	  giving	  rise	  291	   to	   apparently	   non-­‐stationary	   behavior	   and	   statistics	   used	   to	   illustrate	  292	   Koutsoyiannis	   and	  Montanari	   (2015)	   illustrates	   this	  nicely.	   	   	   If	  we	  have	   access	  293	  
only	   to	   a	   limited	   part	   of	   the	   full	   record,	   we	   might	   see	   periods	   of	   different	  294	   statistical	  characteristics,	  or	  periods	  that	  include	  jumps.	  	  	  Real	  hydrological	  data	  295	   might	   certainly	   be	   of	   this	   form,	   but	   the	   identification	   of	   the	   true	   stochastic	  296	   process	   would	   not	   be	   possible	   without	   very	   long	   series	   (this	   is	   true	   for	   any	  297	   fractal	   type	  behavior).	   	   	   The	   fact	   that	  we	  know	   that	   the	   changing	   statistics	   are	  298	   produced	   by	   a	   stationary	   process	   in	   such	   a	   hypothetical	   example,	   does	   not	  299	   negate	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  statistics	  are	  changing	  and	  we	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  using	  an	  300	   oversimplified	  error	  model	  (see	  discussion	  of	  Figure	  2	  below).	  301	   	  302	   Secondly,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  a	  nonlinear	  catchment	  model	  will	  introduce	  changes	  in	  303	   the	  statistical	  properties	  of	  residuals	  both	   in	   the	  way	   it	  processes	  errors	   in	   the	  304	   inputs	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  model	  structural	  error	  that	  cannot	  be	  compensated	  by	  a	  305	   simple	  deterministic	  non-­‐stationarity.	  	  From	  a	  purely	  hydrological	  point	  of	  view	  306	   we	   expect	   that	  model	   residuals	   should	   have	   rather	   different	   characteristics	   on	  307	   the	  rising	  limb	  to	  those	  around	  the	  peak	  to	  those	  on	  the	  falling	  limb	  in	  terms	  of	  308	   bias,	   changing	   variance,	   and	   changing	   autocorrelation.	   The	   problem	   will	   be	  309	   greater	   for	   the	   type	   of	   arbitrary	   event	   to	   event	   epistemic	   input	   (or	   model	  310	   structure)	  error	  discussed	  above.	  	  	  The	  error	  in	  that	  event	  will	  also	  have	  an	  effect	  311	   on	   setting	   up	   the	   antecedent	   conditions	   for	   the	   following	   event,	   and	   in	   some	  312	   catchments,	   for	   some	   time	   into	   the	   future.	   	   	   	   The	   statistics	   of	   the	   error	  will	   be	  313	   changing.	   	   	  Again	  therefore	  we	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  using	  an	  oversimplified	  error	  314	   model.	   	   	   It	   is	  possible	   that	  again	   there	  may	  be	  a	  complex	  stochastic	  model	   that	  315	   would	  describe	  all	  the	  potential	  changes	  in	  error	  statistics,	  but	  it	  is	  doubtful	  if	  it	  316	   would	  be	  identifiable	  given	  the	  small	  sample	  of	  potential	  errors	  in	  a	  calibration	  317	   period.	  	  	  It	  is	  notable	  that,	  even	  given	  a	  long	  period	  of	  calibration	  data,	  Sikorska	  318	   et	   al.	   (2014)	  did	  not	   attempt	   to	   identify	   an	  underlying	   stochastic	  model	   of	   the	  319	   residuals,	   but	   instead	   used	   a	   non-­‐parametric	   probabilistic	   approach	   (in	   the	  320	   reasonable	  expectation	  tradition	  of	  Coxian	  probability,	  Cox,	  1946),	   to	  represent	  321	   the	   changing	   variability	   of	   the	   modelling	   uncertainties	   under	   different	  322	   circumstances	  (see	  also	  Beven	  and	  Smith,	  2014).	   	   	  There	  is	  a	  difficulty	  with	  any	  323	   non-­‐parametric	  method,	  however,	  of	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  potential	  uncertainties	  in	  324	   the	  future	  that	  are	  outside	  the	  range	  of	  those	  seen	  in	  the	  past.	  325	   	  326	   Why	  is	  it	  important	  to	  make	  these	  distinctions?	  	  	  	  It	  is	  because	  it	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  327	   what	  we	   should	   expect	   in	   testing	   a	  model	   as	   a	  hypothesis	   of	   how	  a	   catchment	  328	   functions,	  and	  in	  particular	  whether	  it	  should	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  fit	  for	  purpose.	  	  	  329	   For	  example,	  catchments	  change	  over	  time	  (Non-­‐stationarity	  Class	  2)	  but	  models	  330	   are	   often	   fitted	  with	   parameters	   that	   are	   assumed	   constant	   in	   time	   (and	   often	  331	   space).	   	   	  Why	  is	  this	  considered	  acceptable	  practice?	   	  Perhaps,	  because	  there	  is	  332	   an	   implicit	   expectation	   that	   this	   type	   of	   non-­‐stationarity	  will	   be	   dominated	   by	  333	   uncertainty	   in	   the	   boundary	   conditions	   used	   to	   drive	   a	   model	   (including	   the	  334	   potential	  for	  Non-­‐stationarity	  Class	  3).	  	  	  There	  may,	  of	  course,	  be	  some	  clues	  as	  to	  335	   whether	   these	   non-­‐stationarities	   are	   important	   if	   there	   is	   some	   identifiable	  336	   structure	   in	   the	   model	   residuals	   that	   could	   be	   included	   as	   a	   deterministic	  337	   component	  in	  Non-­‐stationarity	  Class	  1.	   	   	  But	  we	  might	  only	  see	  the	  net	  effect	  of	  338	   all	   these	   non-­‐stationarities	   in	   the	   changing	   properties	   of	   the	   unpredictable	  339	   errors	  (Non-­‐stationary	  Class	  4).	  	  	  But	  these	  are	  rarely	  investigated.	  	  	  In	  practical	  340	   applications,	  statistical	  model	  inference	  is	  normally	  carried	  out	  as	  if	  all	  sources	  of	  341	   error	  were	  aleatory	  with	  simple	  stationary	  properties.	  	  	  	  This	  assumption	  allows	  342	  
the	   full	   power	   of	   statistical	   inference	   to	   be	   applied	   to	   model	   calibration	   but	  343	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   an	   unrealistic	   assumption	   for	   hydrological	   and	   other	  344	   environmental	  models.	  345	   	  	  	  	  346	   	  347	   	  348	  
Defining	   likelihood	   (and	   the	   implications	   for	   information	   content	   and	  349	  
hypothesis	  testing).	  350	   	  351	   The	  advantage	  of	  taking	  a	  formal	  statistical	  approach	  to	  model	  calibration	  is	  that	  352	   there	  is	  a	  formal	   link	  between	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  set	  of	  model	  residuals	  and	  the	  353	   appropriate	   likelihood	   function.	   	   	   If,	   and	   only	   if,	   the	   assumptions	   about	   the	  354	   structure	  of	  the	  errors	  are	  valid,	  then	  there	  is	  an	  additional	  advantage	  that	  there	  355	   is	   a	   theoretical	   estimate	   of	   the	   probability	   of	   predicting	   a	   new	   observation.	  	  356	   These	   advantages	   are	   undermined	   by	   the	   non-­‐stationarities	   that	   arise	   from	  357	   epistemic	  error	  that	  will	  generally	  reduce	  the	  information	  content	  (or	  introduce	  358	   more	  disinformation)	  in	  the	  inference	  process	  than	  would	  be	  the	  case	  if	  all	  errors	  359	   were	  simply	  aleatory	  with	  stationary	  parameters.	  	  So	  treating	  all	  sources	  of	  error	  360	   as	   if	   aleatory	   will	   result	   in	   over-­‐conditioning	   (and	   less	   protection	   against	  361	   surprise	   in	   prediction).	   	   	   There	   is	   evidence	   for	   this	   in	   the	   very	   tight	   posterior	  362	   parameter	   distributions	   that	   often	   arise	   in	   Bayesian	   calibrations	   of	   rainfall	   –363	   runoff	  models.	  	  	  The	  likelihood	  surface	  is	  made	  very	  peaky	  such	  that	  models	  with	  364	   very	   similar	   error	   variance	   can	   have	   tens	   or	   even	   hundreds	   of	   orders	   of	  365	   magnitude	  difference	  in	  likelihood	  (Figure	  2).	  	  That	  really	  does	  not	  seem	  realistic	  366	   to	  me,	  and	  did	  not	  when	  I	  first	  started	  evaluating	  likelihoods	  of	  multiple	  runs	  in	  367	   the	  1980s.	  	  	  The	  origins	  of	  the	  GLUE	  methodology	  lie	  there.	  368	   	  369	   So	  one	  way	  ahead	  here	  might	  be	  to	  find	  more	  realistic	  likelihood	  functions	  that	  370	   reflect	  the	  reduced	  information	  content	  for	  these	  non-­‐ideal	  cases	  and	  are	  robust	  371	   to	   epistemic	   error.	   	   The	   question	   then	   is	   how	   to	   properly	   reflect	   the	   real	  372	   information	   in	   a	   set	   of	   data	   when	   the	   variations	   are	   clearly	   not	   aleatory	   and	  373	   when	   the	   summary	   statistics	   might	   be	   significantly	   period	   dependent.	  	  	   Again,	  374	   whether	  the	  long-­‐term	  properties	  are	  stationary	  or	  not	  is	  not	  really	  relevant,	  we	  375	   want	   to	   protect	   against	   surprise	   in	   prediction	   (as	   far	   as	   is	   possible	   for	   an	  376	   epistemic	  problem).	   In	   the	   rainfall-­‐runoff	  modelling	  case	   it	  has	  been	  suggested	  377	   that	  the	  use	  of	  summary	  statistics	  for	  model	  evaluation,	  such	  as	  the	  flow	  duration	  378	   curve,	  might	  be	  more	  robust	  to	  error	  in	  this	  sense	  (e.g.	  Westerberg	  et	  al.,	  2011b;	  379	   Vrugt	  and	  Sadegh,	  2013).	  380	   	  381	   Beven	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   and	   Beven	   and	   Smith	   (2014)	   show	   how,	   for	   the	   relatively	  382	   flashy	   South	   Tyne	   catchment	   in	   northern	   England	   (322	   km2),	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  383	   differentiate	  obviously	  disinformative	  events	   from	   informative	  events	   in	  model	  384	   calibration	  within	  the	  GLUE	  methodology.	   	   	  They	  take	  an	  event-­‐based	  approach	  385	   to	  model	  evaluation	  that	  tries	  to	  reflect	  the	  relative	  information	  content	  expected	  386	   for	   informative	   and	   disinformative	   events.	   	   They	   suggest	   that	   factors	   that	  will	  387	   increase	   the	   relative	   information	   content	   of	   an	   event	   include:	   the	   relative	  388	   accuracy	  of	  estimation	  of	   the	   inputs	  driving	   the	  model;	   the	  relative	  accuracy	  of	  389	   observations	   with	   which	   model	   outputs	   will	   be	   compared	   (including	  390	   commensurability	   issues);	  and	  the	  unusualness	  of	  an	  event	  (extremes,	  rarity	  of	  391	  
initial	  conditions,….).	  Factors	  that	  will	  decrease	  the	  relative	  information	  content	  392	   of	   an	   event	   include:	   repetition	   (multiple	   examples	   of	   similar	   conditions);	  393	   inconsistency	   of	   the	   input	   and	   output	   data;	   the	   relative	   uncertainty	   of	  394	   observations	   (e.g.	   highly	   uncertain	   overbank	   flood	   discharges	   would	   reduce	  395	   information	   content	   of	   an	   extreme	   event,	   discharges	   for	   catchments	   with	   ill-­‐396	   defined	   rating	   curves	   might	   be	   less	   informative	   than	   in	   catchments	   with	   well	  397	   defined	   curves);	   and	   also	   a	   preceding	   disinformative	   /	   less	   informative	   event	  398	   over	  the	  dynamic	  response	  time	  scale	  of	  the	  catchment.	  	  	  	  399	   	  400	   The	   approach	   depends	   on	   classifying	   events	   prior	   to	   running	   the	   model	   into	  401	   different	   classes	   based	   on	   rainfall	   volume	   and	   antecedent	   conditions.	   Outlier	  402	   events	  can	  be	  identified	  and	  examined	  to	  see	  if	  they	  are	  disinformative	  in	  terms	  403	   of	   their	   runoff	   coefficients	   or	   other	   characteristics.	   	   Limits	   of	   acceptability	   are	  404	   established	   for	   model	   performance	   in	   each	   class	   of	   informative	   events	   and	   a	  405	   likelihood	  measure	   is	  based	  on	  average	  model	  performance	   in	  each	  class.	   	  The	  406	   information	   content	   for	   informative	   events	   following	   disinformative	   events	   is	  407	   weighted	  less	  highly.	  408	   	  409	   Models	   that	   do	   not	   meet	   the	   limits	   of	   acceptability	   are	   rejected	   (given	   zero	  410	   likelihood)	  in	  the	  GLUE	  methodology	  and	  do	  not	  therefore	  contribute	  to	  the	  set	  411	   of	   models	   to	   be	   used	   in	   prediction.	   	   	   This	   is	   one	   way	   of	   testing	   models	   as	  412	   hypotheses.	  	  	  Epistemic	  error	  also	  plays	  a	  role	  here	  in	  that	  we	  would	  not	  want	  to	  413	   make	  false	  negative	  (Type	  II)	  errors	  in	  rejecting	  a	  model	  that	  might	  be	  useful	  in	  414	   prediction	  because	  it	  has	  been	  forced	  with	  poor	  input	  data.	  	  	  This	  is	  more	  serious	  415	   than	  a	  false	  positive	  error	  in	  that	  if	  a	  poor	  model	  is	  not	  initially	  rejected	  we	  can	  416	   hope	  that	  future	  evaluations	  would	  reveal	  its	  limitations.	  	   	   	   	  Statistical	  inference	  417	   deals	  with	   this	  problem	  by	  never	  giving	  a	  zero	   likelihood,	  only	  very	  very	  small	  418	   likelihoods	   to	   models	   that	   do	   not	   perform	   well	   (as	   seen	   in	   the	   orders	   of	  419	   magnitude	  change	  in	  Figure	  2).	  	  	  This	  also	  means,	  however,	  that	  no	  model	  is	  ever	  420	   rejected	  and	  hypothesis	  testing	  has	  to	  depend	  on	  some	  other	  subjective	  criterion,	  421	   such	   as	   some	   informal	   limits	   on	   the	   Bayes	   ratios	   for	   competing	  models.	   	   	   One	  422	   implication	  for	  this	  is	  that	  if	  no	  model	  is	  rejected,	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  the	  423	   best	  model	  found	  is	  fit	  for	  purpose.	  	  This	  must	  also	  be	  assessed	  separately.	  	  	  424	   	  425	   For	   the	   South	   Tyne	   catchment	   it	   turns	   out	   that	   using	   a	   standard	   data	   set,	   as	  426	   collected	   by	   the	   Environment	   Agency,	   there	   were	   a	   large	   number	   of	  427	   disinformative	   events	   as	   distinguished	   by	   unrealistically	   high	   or	   low	   runoff	  428	   coefficients.	   	   Excluding	   these	   events	   from	   the	   model	   calibration	   results	   in	  429	   different	  posterior	  distributions	  of	  the	  model	  parameters	  (see	  Figure	  3).	  	  	  	  It	  also	  430	   allows	   the	   characteristics	   of	   informative	   and	   disinformative	   events	   to	   be	  431	   considered	  separately.	  432	   	  433	   When	  it	  comes	  to	  prediction,	  however,	  we	  do	  not	  know	  a	  priori	  whether	  the	  next	  434	   event	  will	  be	  informative	  or	  disinformative.	  	  This	  can	  only	  be	  evaluated	  post-­‐hoc,	  435	   once	  the	  future	  has	  evolved	  (in	  model	  testing,	  of	  course,	  the	  “future”	  considered	  436	   is	   some	   “validation”	   data	   set).	   	   	   	   This	   may	   involve	   non-­‐stationarities	   of	   error	  437	   characteristics	   that	   have	   not	   been	   seen	   in	   the	   calibration	   period.	   	   	   Beven	   and	  438	   Smith	   (2014)	   allowed	   for	   this	   by	   evaluating	   the	   error	   characteristics	   for	  439	   informative	  and	  disinformative	  events	  separately	  and	  treating	  each	  new	  event	  as	  440	  
if	   it	  might	   be	   either	   informative	   or	   disinformative	   (Figure	   4).	   It	  was	   shown	   to	  441	   help	   in	   spanning	   the	  observations	   for	   events	   later	   shown	   to	  be	  disinformative,	  442	   but	   clearly	   cannot	   deal	   with	   every	   surprise	   that	   might	   occur	   in	   prediction,	  443	   particularly	  when	  the	  system	  itself	  is	  non-­‐stationary.	  444	   	  445	  
Defining	   model	   rejection	   in	   hypothesis	   testing	   (and	   why	   uncertainty	  446	  
estimation	  is	  not	  the	  end	  point	  of	  a	  study)	  447	  
	  448	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	  modelling	   study	   of	   the	   South	   Tyne	   catchment,	   some	  models	  449	   were	  found	  that	  satisfied	  the	  limits	  of	  acceptability.	  	  	  This	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case;	  450	   in	  other	  studies	  no	  models	  have	  satisfied	  all	  the	  criteria	  of	  acceptability	  imposed	  451	   (see,	  for	  example,	  the	  attempts	  at	  “blind	  validation”	  of	  the	  SHE	  model	  by	  Parkin	  452	   et	   al.	   1996,	   and	   Bathurst	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   and	   the	   studies	   of	   Pappenberger	   et	   al.,	  453	   2007;	  Page	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Choi	  and	  Beven,	  2009;	  Dean	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  and	  Mitchell	  et	  454	   al.,	  2011,	  within	  the	  GLUE	  framework	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  models).	  	  455	   	  456	   In	  terms	  of	  the	  science	  this	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  good	  thing	  in	  that	  if	  all	  the	  models	  are	  457	   rejected	   then	   improvements	   must	   be	   made	   to	   either	   the	   data	   or	   the	   model	  458	   structures	  and	  parameter	  sets	  within	  those	  structures	  being	  used.	  	  	  That	  is	  how	  459	   real	  progress	  is	  made.	  	  	  	  But	  the	  possibility	  of	  epistemic	  errors	  in	  the	  data	  used	  to	  460	   force	  a	  model	  might	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  make	  an	  assessment	  of	  how	  constrained	  461	   any	   limits	   of	   acceptability	   should	   be.	   	   	   We	   know	   that	   all	   models	   are	  462	   approximations	  and	  so	  such	  limits	  should	  be	  set	  to	  reflect	  the	  expectation	  of	  how	  463	   well	  a	  model	  should	  be	  able	  to	  perform.	  	  This	  is	  a	  balance.	  	  We	  should	  not	  expect	  464	   a	  model	  to	  predict	  to	  a	  greater	  accuracy	  than	  the	  assessed	  errors	  in	  the	  input	  and	  465	   evaluation	   data.	   	   	   If	   it	   does	   we	   might	   suspect	   that	   it	   has	   been	   over-­‐fitted	   to	  466	   accommodate	  some	  of	  the	  particular	  realisation	  of	  error	  in	  the	  calibration	  data.	  	  	  	  467	   	  468	   But	  we	  also	  do	  not	  want	  to	  make	  that	  Type	  II	  false	  negative	  error	  of	  rejecting	  a	  469	   model	   that	  would	  be	  useful	   in	  prediction,	   just	  because	  of	   epistemic	   errors	   and	  470	   disinformation	   in	   the	   forcing	   or	   evaluation	   data.	   	   This	   suggests	   that	   if	   we	   do	  471	   reject	  all	  the	  models	  tried	  as	  not	  fit	  for	  purpose	  we	  should	  look	  first	  at	  the	  data	  472	   where	   the	   model	   is	   failing	   and	   assess	   the	   potential	   for	   error	   in	   that	   data,	  473	   especially	   if	   the	   failures	   are	   consistent	   across	   a	   large	   number	   of	   models.	   In	  474	   rainfall-­‐runoff	   modelling	   this	   is	   rarely	   done,	   but	   hydrological	   modellers	   are	  475	   beginning	   to	   become	   more	   aware	   of	   the	   issues	   (e.g.	   Krueger	   et	   al.,	   2009;	  476	   McMillan	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  2012;	  Westerberg	  et	  al.,	  2011a;	  Kauffeldt	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  We	  477	   also	   have	   to	   be	   careful	   that	   we	   have	   searched	   the	  model	   space	   adequately	   to	  478	   ensure	   that	   no	   models	   have	   been	   missed.	   	   	   This	   can	   be	   difficult	   with	   high	  479	   numbers	  of	  parameters,	  when	  the	  areas	  of	  acceptable	  models	  in	  the	  model	  space	  480	   might	  be	  quite	  local.	  	  Iorgulescu	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  for	  example	  made	  2	  billion	  runs	  of	  a	  481	   model	   in	   a	   17	   parameter	   space	   of	   which	   216	   were	   found	   to	   satisfy	   (rather	  482	   constrained)	   limits	  of	   acceptability.	   	  Blazkova	  and	  Beven	   (2009)	  made	  600000	  483	   runs	  of	   a	   continuous	   simulation	   flood	   frequency	  model	  and	   found	   that	  only	  37	  484	   satisfied	  all	  the	  limits	  of	  acceptability.	  	  	  They	  also	  demonstrated	  that	  whether	  this	  485	   was	   the	   case	   depended	   on	   the	   stochastic	   realisation	   of	   the	   inputs	   used.	  	  	  	  486	   Improved	   efficiency	   of	   sampling	  within	   this	   type	   of	   rejectionist	   strategy	  might	  487	   then	  be	  valuable	  (e.g.	  the	  DREAMABC	  code	  of	  Sadegh	  and	  Vrugt,	  2014).	  	  488	   	  489	  
But	  where	  all	  the	  models	  tried	  consistently	  fail,	  and	  we	  do	  not	  have	  any	  reason	  490	   for	  suggesting	  that	  the	  failure	  is	  due	  to	  disinformative	  data,	  then	  it	  suggests	  that	  491	   a	   better	  model	   is	   needed.	   	   	   This	  might	   lead	   to	   new	  hypotheses	   about	   how	   the	  492	   system	   is	   functioning,	   or	   new	   ways	   of	   representing	   some	   processes	   (see	   also	  493	   Gupta	  and	  Nearing,	  2014).	  	  	  	  Model	  rejection	  is	  not	  a	  failure,	  it	  is	  an	  opportunity	  494	   to	   improve	  either	   the	  model	   or	  data	  or	  both.	   	   	   Finding	   a	  better	  model	  will	   not	  495	   provide	  total	  protection	  against	  future	  epistemic	  surprises	  but	  would,	  we	  hope,	  496	   be	  a	  step	   in	   the	  right	  direction.	   	   	  How	  big	  a	  step	   is	  possible,	  however,	  will	  also	  497	   depend	  on	  reducing	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  forcing	  and	  evaluation	  data.	  498	   	  	  	  	  499	  
Communicating	  uncertainty	  to	  users	  of	  model	  predictions	  500	   	  501	   There	   are	   two	   main	   reasons	   for	   incorporating	   uncertainty	   estimation	   into	   a	  502	   study.	  	  	  One	  is	  for	  scientific	  purposes,	  to	  improve	  understanding	  of	  the	  problem,	  503	   and	  carry	  out	  hypothesis	  testing	  more	  rigorously.	  	  	  The	  second	  is	  because	  taking	  504	   account	   of	   the	   uncertainty	   in	   model	   predictions	  might	   make	   a	   difference	   to	   a	  505	   decision	   that	   is	   made	   in	   a	   practical	   application,	   for	   example,	   whether	   the	  506	   planning	   process	   can	   take	   account	   of	   uncertainty	   in	   the	   predicted	   extent	   of	  507	   flooding	   for	   the	   statutory	   design	   return	   period.	   	   For	   this	   second	   purpose	   it	   is	  508	   necessary	   to	   communicate	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   model	   predictions,	   and	   their	  509	   associated	  uncertainties,	  to	  decision	  makers	  (e.g.	  Faulkner	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  510	   	  511	   But,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   there	   can	   be	   no	   right	   answer	   to	   the	   estimation	   of	  512	   uncertainty.	  	  Every	  estimate	  is	  conditional	  on	  the	  assumptions	  that	  are	  made	  and	  513	   in	  most	   applications	   there	   are	  many	   assumptions	   that	  must	   be	  made	   (see,	   for	  514	   example,	  Beven	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  In	  this	  case	  it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  the	  communication	  515	   process	  if	  the	  users,	  or	  particular	  groups	  of	  users,	  are	  introduced	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  516	   those	  assumptions.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  will	  generally	  facilitate	  the	  communication	  process	  517	   if	  the	  users	  can	  be	  involved	  in	  making	  decisions	  about	  the	  relevant	  assumptions	  518	   whenever	  possible.	   	   The	   collection	  of	   assumptions	   that	  underlie	   any	  particular	  519	   application	   can	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   form	   of	   “Condition	   Tree”	   (Beven	   and	  520	   Alcock,	   2012;	   Beven	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   	   	   	   At	   each	   level	   of	   the	   condition	   tree	   the	  521	   assumptions	  must	  be	  made	  explicit,	  forming	  a	  form	  of	  audit	  trail	  for	  the	  analysis.	  	  522	   It	  has	  even	  been	  suggested1	  that	  every	  uncertainty	  assessment	  should	  be	  labelled	  523	   with	  the	  names	  of	  those	  who	  produced	  it	  (and,	  by	  extension,	  perhaps	  those	  who	  524	   agreed	  the	  assumptions	  on	  which	  it	  is	  based).	  	  	  525	   	  526	  
Can	  we	  talk	  of	  confidence	  rather	  than	  uncertainty	  in	  model	  simulations?	  527	   	  	  	  528	   Decisions	   about	   hydrological	   systems	   are	   made	   under	   uncertainty,	   and	   often	  529	   severe	  uncertainty,	  all	   the	   time.	   	   	  Decision	  and	  policy	  makers	  are,	  however,	   far	  530	   more	   interested	   in	   evidence	   than	   uncertainty.	   	   	   Evidence-­‐based	   framing	   has	  531	   become	  the	  norm	  in	  many	  areas	  of	  environmental	  policy	  (e.g.	  Boyd,	  2013).	   	   	   In	  532	   the	   UK,	   the	   Government	   has	   considered	   standards	   for	   evidence	   (Intellectual	  533	   Property	  Office,	  2011)	  and	  the	  Environment	  Agency	  has	  an	  Evidence	  Directorate	  534	   and	  produces	  documents	  summarising	  the	  evidence	  that	  underpins	  its	  corporate	  535	   strategy.	  	  	  Clearly	  such	  an	  Agency	  wants	  to	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  evidence	  used	  536	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  example	  by	  Jonty	  Rougier	  at	  Bristol	  University	  
in	   such	   policy	   framing.	   	   	   Confidence	   should	   be	   inversely	   related	   to	   error	   and	  537	   uncertainty,	  but	  is	  often	  assessed	  without	  reference	  to	  quantifying	  uncertainty	  in	  538	   either	  data	  or	  model	  results.	  	  	  	  539	   	  540	   An	  example	  case	  study	  is	  the	  benchmarking	  exercise	  carried	  out	  to	  test	  2D	  flood	  541	   routing	  models	   (Environment	  Agency,	  2013).	   	  Nineteen	  models	  were	   tested	  on	  542	   12	  different	  test	  cases,	  ranging	  from	  dam	  break	  to	  fluvial	  and	  urban	  flooding.	  	  All	  543	   the	  test	  cases	  were	  hypothetical	  with	  specified	  roughness	  parameters,	  even	  if	  in	  544	   some	   of	   the	   cases	   the	   geometry	   was	   based	   on	   real	   areas.	   	   Some	   had	   some	  545	   observations	  available	  from	  laboratory	  test	  cases.	   	  Thus,	  confidence	  in	  this	  case	  546	   represents	   agreement	   amongst	  models.	   It	  was	   shown	   that	  not	   all	  models	  were	  547	   appropriate	  for	  all	  test	  cases,	  particularly	  those	  involving	  supercritical	  flow,	  and	  548	   that	   some	  models	   that	  used	   simplified	   forms	  of	   the	  St.	  Venant	   equations	  while	  549	   faster	   to	   run	   had	   more	   limited	   applicability.	   	   	   Differences	   between	   models	  550	   depended	   on	   model	   implementation	   and	   numerics,	   so	   that	   acceptability	   of	   a	  551	   model	   in	   terms	   of	   agreement	   with	   other	   models	   was	   essentially	   a	   subjective	  552	   judgment.	  	  	  553	   	  554	   There	   is	  an	   implicit	  assumption	   in	  assessing	  confidence	   in	  this	  way	  that	   in	  real	  555	   applications	  to	   less	  than	  ideal	  datasets,	   the	  models	  that	  agree	  can	  be	  calibrated	  556	   to	  give	  satisfactory	  simulations	  for	  mapping	  and	  planning	  purposes.	   	   	  While	  the	  557	   report	   did	   recommend	   that	   future	   comparisons	   should	   also	   aim	   to	   assess	   the	  558	   value	   of	   models	   in	   assessing	   uncertainty	   in	   the	   predictions,	   the	   impacts	   of	  559	   epistemic	  uncertainty	  in	  defining	  the	  input,	  roughness	  parameters,	  and	  details	  of	  560	   the	   geometry	   of	   the	   flow	   domain	   would	   seem	   to	   be	  more	   important	   than	   the	  561	   differences	  between	  models	  in	  which	  we	  have	  confidence	  after	  such	  testing	  (see	  562	   Beven	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   	   	   In	   real	   applications	   confidence	   can	   only	   be	   assessed	   by	  563	   comparison	  with	  observed	  data,	  while	  allowing	  for	  uncertainties	  in	  inputs.	  	  Even	  564	   then,	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	   effective	   values	   of	   roughness	   parameters	   might	  565	   change	  with	   the	  magnitude	  of	  an	  event,	   so	   that	  confidence	   in	  calibration	  might	  566	   not	  carry	  over	  to	  more	  extreme	  events	  (Romanowicz	  and	  Beven,	  2003).	  	  	  Yet,	  for	  567	   planning	  purposes,	  the	  Environment	  Agency	  is	  interested	  in	  mapping	  the	  extent	  568	   of	  floods	  with	  annual	  exceedance	  probabilities	  (AEP)	  of	  0.01	  and	  0.001.	  	  	  It	  is,	  of	  569	   course,	   rather	   rare	   to	   have	   observations	   for	   floods	   within	   this	   range	   of	   AEP,	  570	   more	  often	  we	  need	  to	  extrapolate	  to	  such	  levels.	  	  571	   	  572	   It	  is	  possible	  to	  assess	  the	  uncertainty	  associated	  with	  such	  predictions	  and	  to	  573	   visualise	  that	  uncertainty	  either	  as	  probability	  maps	  (e.g.	  Leedal	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  	  574	   Neal	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Beven	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  	  or	  as	  different	  line	  styles	  depending	  on	  the	  575	   uncertainty	  in	  flood	  extent	  in	  different	  areas	  (Wicks	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  	  In	  some	  areas,	  576	   where	  the	  flood	  fills	  the	  valley	  floor,	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  flood	  extent	  might	  be	  577	   small,	  but	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  water	  depth,	  with	  its	  implications	  for	  damage	  578	   calculations,	  might	  be	  important.	  	  	  In	  other,	  low	  slope,	  areas	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  579	   extent	  might	  be	  significant.	  	  	  The	  advantage	  of	  doing	  both	  estimates	  is	  that	  580	   confidence	  can	  be	  given	  a	  scale,	  even	  if	  as	  in	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  581	   Climate	  Change	  (IPCC)	  that	  scale	  is	  expressed	  in	  words	  rather	  than	  probability.	  	  	  582	   In	  fact,	  the	  IPCC	  distinguishes	  a	  scale	  of	  confidence	  (from	  “very	  low”	  to	  “very	  583	   high”)	  from	  a	  scale	  of	  likelihood	  (from	  “exceptionally	  unlikely”	  to	  “virtually	  584	   certain”	  based	  on	  a	  probability	  scale)	  	  (IPCC,	  2010).	  	  Confidence	  indicates	  how	  585	  
convergent	  the	  estimates	  of	  past	  and	  future	  change	  are	  at	  the	  current	  time;	  586	   likelihood	  the	  degree	  of	  belief	  in	  particular	  future	  outcomes.	  	  Thus	  the	  summary	  587	   of	  the	  outcomes	  from	  IPCC5	  states	  that	  “ocean	  warming	  dominates	  the	  increase	  588	   in	  energy	  stored	  in	  the	  climate	  system,	  accounting	  for	  more	  than	  90%	  of	  the	  589	   energy	  accumulated	  between	  1971	  and	  2010	  (high	  confidence).	  It	  is	  virtually	  590	  
certain	  that	  the	  upper	  ocean	  (0−700	  m)	  warmed	  from	  1971	  to	  2010,	  and	  it	  likely	  591	   warmed	  between	  the	  1870s	  and	  1971.	  It	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  the	  Arctic	  sea	  ice	  cover	  592	   will	  continue	  to	  shrink	  and	  thin	  and	  that	  Northern	  Hemisphere	  spring	  snow	  593	   cover	  will	  decrease	  during	  the	  21st	  century	  as	  global	  mean	  surface	  temperature	  594	   rises.”	  (IPCC,	  2013).	  595	   	  596	   Now	  the	  IPCC	  will	  not	  assign	  any	  probability	  estimates	  to	  any	  of	  the	  model	  runs	  597	   that	  contribute	  to	  their	  conclusions.	  	  	  They	  are	  described	  as	  projections,	  subject	  598	   to	  both	  model	  limitations	  and	  conditional	  on	  scenarios	  of	  future	  greenhouse	  gas	  599	   emissions.	  	  	  	  The	  future	  scenarios,	  and	  hence	  any	  probability	  statements,	  are	  600	   necessarily	  incomplete.	  	  	  This	  has	  not,	  however,	  stopped	  the	  presentation	  of	  601	   future	  projections	  in	  probabilistic	  terms	  in	  other	  contexts,	  such	  as	  those	  derived	  602	   from	  an	  ensemble	  of	  regional	  model	  runs	  in	  the	  UK	  Climate	  Projections	  (UKCP09,	  603	   see	  http://ukclimateprojections.defra.gov.uk).	  	  	  The	  outcomes	  from	  UKCP09	  are	  604	   being	  used	  to	  assess	  impacts	  on	  UK	  hydrology	  (e.g.	  Bell	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Kay	  and	  605	   Jones,	  2012;	  Cloke	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  but	  there	  is	  sufficient	  epistemic	  uncertainty	  606	   associated	  with	  both	  the	  input	  scenarios	  and	  the	  climate	  model	  implementations	  607	   to	  be	  concerned	  about	  expressions	  of	  confidence	  or	  likelihood	  in	  these	  cases,	  608	   when	  the	  probabilities	  may	  be	  incomplete	  and	  we	  should	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  609	   potential	  for	  the	  future	  to	  surprise	  (Beven,	  2011;	  Wilby	  and	  Dessai,	  2010).	  	  	  610	   Incomplete	  probabilities	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  a	  risk-­‐based	  decision	  theoretic	  611	   approach	  based	  on	  the	  exceedance	  probabilities	  of	  risk,	  although	  it	  might	  be	  612	   possible	  to	  assess	  a	  range	  of	  exceedance	  curves	  under	  different	  assumptions	  613	   about	  future	  scenarios	  (Rougier	  and	  Beven,	  2013).	  	  614	   	  615	   We	  are	  often	  in	  this	  situation.	  	  Hence	  the	  need	  to	  agree	  assumptions	  and	  616	   methodologies	  with	  potential	  users	  of	  model	  outcomes	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  last	  617	   section.	  	  	  Consequently	  any	  expressions	  of	  confidence	  or	  likelihood	  are	  618	   conditional	  on	  the	  assumptions,	  a	  conditionality	  that	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  what	  619	   has	  been	  included,	  but	  also	  what	  might	  have	  been	  left	  out	  of	  an	  analysis.	  	  	  	  There	  620	   will	  of	  course	  be	  epistemic	  uncertainties	  that	  are	  “unknown	  unknowns”.	  	  Those	  621	   we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  worry	  about	  until,	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  they	  are	  recognized	  as	  622	   issues	  and	  become	  “known	  unknowns”.	  	  	  More	  important	  are	  factors	  that	  are	  623	   already	  “known	  unknowns”,	  but	  which	  are	  not	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  because	  624	   of	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  or	  lack	  of	  computing	  power	  or	  some	  other	  reason.	  	  	  625	   Confidence	  and	  likelihood	  need	  to	  reflect	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  potential	  decisions	  to	  626	   such	  factors	  since	  they	  are	  not	  easily	  quantified	  in	  uncertainty	  estimation.	  	  	  	  	  	  627	   	  628	  
An	  uncertain	  future?	  629	  
	  630	   So	  while	  quantitative	  uncertainty	  estimation	  is	  valuable	  in	  assessing	  the	  range	  of	  631	   potential	  outcomes	  consistent	  with	  an	  (agreed)	  set	  of	  assumptions,	  it	  will	  632	   generally	  be	  the	  case	  that	  difficult	  to	  handle	  epistemic	  uncertainties	  will	  mean	  633	   that	  the	  assessment	  is	  incomplete	  (for	  good	  epistemic	  reasons).	  	  	  	  Future	  634	  
surprises	  come	  from	  that	  incompleteness	  (e.g.	  Beven,	  2013).	  	  	  Assessments	  of	  635	   evidence,	  and	  expressions	  of	  confidence	  and	  likelihood	  should	  reflect	  the	  636	   potential	  for	  surprise	  and	  robust	  decisions	  need	  to	  be	  insensitive	  to	  both	  the	  637	   assessed	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  surprise	  (erring	  on	  the	  side	  of	  caution,	  638	   risk	  aversion	  or	  being	  precautionary).	  	  	  From	  a	  modeller’s	  perspective	  this	  has	  639	   the	  advantage	  that	  it	  will	  reduce	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  future	  post-­‐audit	  analysis	  640	   showing	  that	  the	  model	  predictions	  were	  wrong,	  even	  if	  why	  that	  is	  the	  case	  641	   might	  be	  obvious	  with	  hindsight	  (it	  is	  quite	  possible	  that	  this	  will	  be	  the	  case	  642	   with	  the	  current	  generation	  of	  climate	  models	  as	  future	  improvements	  start	  to	  643	   reduce	  the	  errors	  in	  predicting	  historical	  precipitation,	  for	  example).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  644	   	  645	   From	  a	  decision	  maker’s	  perspective,	   the	   issues	  are	  more	  problematic.	   	   If,	  even	  646	   with	   a	   detailed	   (and	   expensive)	   assessment	   of	   uncertainty,	   there	   remains	   a	  647	   potential	  for	  surprise	  then	  just	  how	  risk	  averse	  or	  precautionary	  is	  it	  necessary	  648	   to	   be	   in	   order	   to	   make	   robust	   decisions	   about	   the	   future.	   	   	   The	   answer	   is	  649	   probably	   that	   we	   often	   cannot	   afford	   to	   be	   sufficiently	   robust	   in	   adapting	   to	  650	   change;	  it	  will	  just	  be	  too	  expensive.	  	  	  The	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  protecting	  against	  651	   different	  future	  extremes	  can	  be	  assessed,	  even	  if	  the	  probability	  of	  that	  extreme	  652	   might	  be	  difficult	  to	  estimate.	  	  	  In	  that	  situation,	  the	  controlling	  factor	  is	  likely	  to	  653	   be	   the	   available	  budget	   (Beven,	   2011).	   	   	   That	   should	  not,	   of	   course,	   take	   away	  654	   from	  the	  responsibility	  for	  ensuring	  that	  the	  science	  that	  underlies	  the	  evidence	  655	   is	  as	  robust	  as	  possible,	  and	  communicated	  properly,	  even	  if	  those	  uncertainties	  656	   are	  high	  and	  we	  cannot	  be	  very	  confident	  about	  future	   likelihoods	  in	  providing	  657	   evidence	  to	  decision	  makers.	  	  	  658	   	  659	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  or	  quantities	  in	  the	  relevant	  domain	  actually	  mean	  (there	  are	  many	  examples	   in	   hydrology	   including	   storm	   runoff,	  baseflow,	   hydraulic	   conductivity,	   stationarity	   etc).	  	  	  This	  can	  partly	  result	  from	  commensurability	  issues	  that	   quantities	  with	   the	   same	   name	   have	   different	  meanings	  in	  different	  contexts	  or	  scales.	  Ontological	  Uncertainty	   Uncertainty	  associated	  with	  different	  belief	  systems.	  	  Relevant	   example	   here	   might	   be	   beliefs	   about	  whether	   formal	   probability	   is	   an	   appropriate	  framework	   for	   the	   representation	   of	   beliefs	   about	  the	   nature	   of	   model	   residuals.	   Different	   beliefs	  about	   the	   appropriate	   assumptions	   could	   lead	   to	  very	   different	   uncertainty	   estimates	   so	   that	   every	  uncertainty	   estimate	   will	   be	   conditional	   on	   the	  underlying	  beliefs	  and	  consequent	  assumptions.	  
	  886	  
Table	   2.	   	   Defining	   non-­‐stationarity.	   	   	   Different	   classes	   of	   epistemic	   error	  887	  
that	  lead	  to	  non-­‐stationarity	  in	  model	  residual	  characteristics.	  888	  
Class	   Source	   Description	  1	   Non-­‐stationarity	  of	  a	  stochastic	  process	   Change	  over	  time	  that	  can	  be	  described	  by	   a	   deterministic	   function,	   including	  structure	   in	  model	  residuals	   that	  might	  compensate	   for	   consistent	   model	   or	  boundary	   condition	   error.	   	   	   All	   other	  variability	   will	   be	   stochastic	   in	   nature	  (see	   Koutsoyiannis	   and	   Montanari,	  2015)	  	  2	   Non-­‐stationarity	  in	  catchment	  characteristics	   Expectation	  that	  model	  parameters	  and	  possibly	   structure	   representing	  catchment	   characteristics	   will	   change	  over	   time	   or	   space	   in	   a	   way	   that	   will	  induce	   model	   prediction	   error	   if	  parameters	  are	  considered	  stationary	  3	   Non-­‐stationarity	  in	  boundary	  conditions	   Expectation	   that	   model	   boundary	  conditions	   will	   change	   over	   time	   or	  space	   in	   a	   way	   that	   will	   induce	   model	  prediction	  error	   if	  boundary	  conditions	  are	   poorly	   estimated.	   	   	   In	   some	   cases	  may	   include	   disinformative	   data	   as	  defined	  in	  the	  text.	  4	   Non-­‐stationarity	  in	  model	  residual	  characteristics	  	   Expectation	   that	   the	   statistical	  characteristics	   of	   the	   model	   residuals	  will	  vary	  significantly	  in	  time	  and	  space	  because	   of	   epistemic	   uncertainties	  about	   the	   causes	   of	   the	   unpredictable	  model	  error.	  	  	  May	  result	  from	  arbitrary	  epistemic	   uncertainties	   in	   boundary	  conditions,	   long-­‐term	   stochastic	  variability	  or	  inclusion	  of	  disinformative	  calibration	  data.	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Figure	  1.	  	  Example	  of	  an	  event	  where	  the	  runoff	  coefficient	  based	  on	  the	  measured	  893	  
rainfalls	  and	  stream	  discharges	  is	  about	  1.4.	  	  	  This	  clearly	  violates	  mass	  balance	  and	  will	  894	  
therefore	  be	  disinformative	  in	  calibrating	  a	  model	  that	  is	  constrained	  to	  maintain	  mass	  895	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Figure	  2.	  	  Top:	  Root	  mean	  square	  errors	  for	  four	  model	  parameter	  sets	  within	  the	  same	  900	  
model	  structure	  (a	  simple	  single	  tank	  conceptual	  rainfall-­‐runoff	  model,	  see	  Beven	  and	  901	  
Smith,	  2014).	  Bottom:	  	  Likelihood	  ratios	  or	  posterior	  odds	  for	  3	  of	  the	  models,	  relative	  to	  902	  
the	  first	  (+	  symbol	  in	  upper	  plot),	  evaluated	  using	  a	  formal	  likelihood	  	  and	  updated	  after	  903	  
the	  addition	  of	  	  further	  years	  of	  model	  residuals.	  The	  formal	  likelihood	  used	  allows	  for	  a	  904	  
mean	  bias,	  constant	  variance	  and	  1st	  order	  autocorrelation	  and	  assumes	  a	  Gaussian	  905	  
distribution	  of	  model	  residuals.	  	  While	  similar	  in	  root	  mean	  square	  error	  (and	  visual	  906	  
performance),	  the	  different	  models	  have	  likelihood	  ratios	  that	  evolve	  to	  be	  1040	  different	  907	  
as	  6	  years	  of	  data	  are	  added,	  followed	  by	  a	  rapid	  reduction	  in	  likelihood	  ratio	  over	  the	  908	  
next	  3	  years.	  	  	  	  909	  
	   	  910	  


















Figure	  3.	  	  Posterior	  probability	  density	  functions	  for	  model	  parameters	  evaluated	  both	  912	  
with	  (solid	  line)	  and	  without	  (dotted	  line)	  calibration	  events	  classified	  as	  disinformative.	  913	  
Further	  details	  of	  this	  study	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Beven	  and	  Smith	  (2014).	  914	  
	  915	  
	  916	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Figure	  4.	  	  A	  sample	  of	  events	  taken	  from	  the	  model	  evaluation	  period.	  	  	  Each	  event	  is	  918	  
treated	  as	  if	  it	  is	  either	  informative	  (shaded	  95%	  prediction	  bounds)	  or	  disinformative	  919	  
(dotted	  95%	  prediction	  bounds).	  	  The	  first	  event	  is	  evaluated	  (a	  posteriori)	  as	  920	  
disinformative,	  the	  last	  two	  as	  informative.	  	  Further	  details	  of	  this	  study	  can	  be	  found	  in	  921	  
Beven	  and	  Smith	  (2014).	  922	   	  923	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